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Humans spontaneously imbue the world with social meaning: we
see not only emotions and intentional behaviors in humans and
other animals, but also anger in the movements of thunderstorms
and willful sabotage in crashing computers. Converging evidence
supports a role for the amygdala, a collection of nuclei in the
temporal lobe, in processing emotionally and socially relevant
information. Here, we report that a patient with bilateral amyg-
dala damage described a film of animated shapes (normally seen
as full of social content) in entirely asocial, geometric terms,
despite otherwise normal visual perception. Control tasks showed
that the impairment did not result from a global inability to
describe social stimuli or a bias in language use, nor was a similar
impairment observed in eight comparison subjects with damage to
orbitofrontal cortex. This finding extends the role of the amygdala
to the social attributions we make even to stimuli that are not
explicitly social and, in so doing, suggests that the human capacity
for anthropomorphizing draws on some of the same neural sys-
tems as do basic emotional responses.
The word ‘‘anthropomorphizing’’ suggests inaccurate judg-ments of what we perceive; however, this negative connota-
tion must be reconciled with the ubiquity of the phenomenon in
humans. Social psychology and, more recently, evolutionary
psychology and cognitive neuroscience have stressed that social
judgments can be automatic and serve an adaptive role in guiding
our behavior in a complex social environment. Certain config-
ural cues [e.g., the presence of eyes, (1)] and motion cues [e.g.,
contingent movement, (2)] seem to trigger an automatic attri-
bution of animacy andor agency. The anthropologist Stewart
Guthrie suggests that humans evolved a propensity to anthro-
pomorphize because failures to do so would have been more
costly than overattribution (3). Cajoling one’s computer, feeling
sympathy for a dying houseplant, or being wary of forest trolls,
while not entirely free of cost, are nonetheless better than failing
to appease an angry dominant conspecific, alienating potential
mates, or misperceiving a stalking predator as a rustling tree.
A classic stimulus for eliciting anthropomorphic attributions is
a short film, constructed by the psychologists Heider and Simmel
in the 1940s, which depicts the movements of three shapes for2
min and is normally described as the social interactions of three
human-like characters (4). Viewers commonly ascribe not only
intentions to the moving shapes, but also emotions, gender,
relationships, and personality traits. Subsequent studies using
the original stimulus or similar films have shown that the
tendency to describe it in anthropomorphic terms occurs across
cultures (5, 6), is evident by age 5 (7), and is attenuated in autism
(8–10).
The neural circuitry subserving the perception and processing
of socially relevant stimuli has been a subject of considerable
study in recent years (for reviews see refs. 11–14). Both lesion
and functional neuroimaging studies have underscored the im-
portance of the amygdala for processing emotional information.
People with bilateral amygdala damage show impairments rec-
ognizing facial expressions of emotions (15, 16), and viewing
emotional faces elicits amygdala activation in healthy subjects
(17, 18), even when they are not aware of the stimuli (19, 20).
Further support for the amygdala’s automatic processing of
emotional information comes from findings that it can be
engaged independently of attention (ref. 21, but see ref. 22), and
that electrophysiological responses within it are triggered at very
short latencies (23).
The amygdala is also involved in processing more complex
social information from visual stimuli. For instance, amygdala
damage results in impairments detecting faux pas (24) and in
judging trustworthiness (25), and amygdala activation is ob-
served in healthy subjects when they view faces that look
untrustworthy, even when no explicit judgment about trustwor-
thiness is required in the task (26). These findings have led to two
conclusions about the amygdala’s role in social cognition: first,
it participates both in basic emotional processing as well as in
more complex social judgment; and second, this processing is
often automatic and occurs below the level of conscious aware-
ness. One interpretation of these dual conclusions is that they are
causally related: one mechanism by which we interpret the social
world may be through automatic, obligatory activation of emo-
tional reactions.
If such processing depends on the amygdala for stimuli that are
overtly emotional or social, a natural question is whether this
dependency might extend to anthropomorphic social judgments
about stimuli that are not explicitly human. In the current study,
we analyzed the emotional and social attributions made by a rare
subject with complete bilateral amygdala damage when shown
the Heider and Simmel film mentioned above, and compared her
responses to those of a group of demographically matched
control subjects.
Methods
Subjects. Subject SM has complete, bilateral damage to the
amygdala, as well as minor damage to adjacent anterior ento-
rhinal cortex, due to Urbach–Wiethe disease (Fig. 1; see ref. 27
for detailed demographic and neuropsychological information).
She has normal basic visual perception and attention, performs
normally on tests of language ability, and has an IQ in the normal
range, but also features a previously documented impairment in
making certain emotional and social judgments about human
faces (27). SM was compared with nine age-, gender-, and
education-matched, neurologically healthy control subjects on
the target task, and five age-, gender-, and education-matched
healthy control subjects on the control task. In addition, she was
compared with eight neurological comparison subjects with
unilateral (one left, two right) or bilateral damage to orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC). We chose these neurological comparison
subjects with damage to OFC to provide a strong test for the
specificity of the impairment to amygdala damage because
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damage to the OFC is also known to result in impaired emotional
and social processing (28, 29). All subjects with OFC lesions had
normal visual perception, memory, language, and IQ. Neuro-
logical subjects were selected from the Patient Registry of the
Division of Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neurology,
University of Iowa. All subjects gave informed consent, as
approved by the University of Iowa Institutional Review Board.
Stimulus and Target Task. We used a video of the original Heider
and Simmel film (4), which is silent,90 s long, and depicts three
shapes moving around the outline of a larger rectangle (Fig. 2
and Movie 1, which is published as supporting information on the
PNAS web site). Subjects were seated 1.5 m from the TV screen
and were told before the start of the film that they would see a
silent movie ‘‘about two minutes long,’’ that they should pay
attention and not talk while watching it, and that, when it was
over, they would be asked to tell the experimenter what they saw.
No further information about the content of the movie was
given. Immediately after the presentation, the experimenter
started a tape recorder and asked the subject, ‘‘Tell me what you
saw,’’ again without any further prompts. After this initial
description was recorded, subjects were shown the movie a
second time and were administered a structured questionnaire
that included explicit questions about the intentions, emotions,
and personalities of the geometric figures in the film. After
answering all of these questions, which took 20 min, subjects
were asked to tell the story of the movie a second time. Thus, the
experiment yielded two descriptions of the movie, one before
and one after the questionnaire. The entire series of responses
was tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis.
It is important to note that the initial description occurred with
no cues from the experimenter that the movie should be
described in anthropomorphic or affective terms: we did not ask
subjects to tell a story and did not provide any indication that the
shapes could be considered as animate characters. The second
description was recorded after an extended series of questions
that may have led subjects to consider the video in social terms
if they had not already. Therefore, in the opening approach to
the data analysis, we analyzed the initial and final descriptions
separately.
SM completed the entire experiment on two occasions sepa-
rated by 18 months; all other subjects were tested once.
Transcripts of subjects’ narratives were analyzed by using the
computer program LINGUISTIC INQUIRY AND WORD COUNT 2001
[LIWC2001; (30)], which counts the total number of words in each
sample as well as percentages of words per sample in each of 74
categories. We focused on three a priori categories, two relevant
to emotion attribution andor anthropomorphizing (Affective or
Emotional Processes, hereafter ‘‘Affect,’’ and Social Processes)
and a control category (Motion, hereafter ‘‘Movement’’).
The Affect category contains 615 words drawn from two
subcategories called Positive Emotions (e.g., ‘‘happy,’’ ‘‘joy,’’ and
‘‘win’’) and Negative Emotions (e.g., ‘‘hate,’’ ‘‘enemy,’’ and
‘‘nervous’’). The second target category, Social Processes, is
made up of 314 words, including social pronouns (e.g., ‘‘he’’),
communication verbs (‘‘share’’), and references to family,
friends, and other humans. The Movement category includes
words such as ‘‘move’’ and ‘‘go.’’ We compared SM’s word use
in these three categories with those of control subjects using
Z-scores with 95% confidence intervals. In addition, as an
overall index of anthropomorphizing, we calculated the differ-
ence between the summed percentage of words in the Affect and
Social Processes categories and the percentage of words in the
Movement category [(Affect  Social)  Movement].
Control Tasks. To ensure that any abnormalities in SM’s descrip-
tion did not result from a nonspecific abnormality in her use of
words, or a global impairment in social perception, we used two
control tasks.
Questionnaire items analysis. We adapted two indices from Klin’s (9)
SAT method to code subjects’ answers to questions about the
stimulus film: the Person Index and the Problem-Solving Index.
The Person Index is based on subjects’ answers to the questions
‘‘What kind of person is X?’’ where X is, in turn, each of the three
objects in the movie. This index measures the extent to which
subjects derive stable personality features from the objects’
actions in the movie, with scores ranging from 0 (only physical
properties attributed) through 6 (multiple attributions of psy-
chological traits; see Klin (9) for details). Because we had also
included the questions ‘‘What is X like?’’ for all three objects, we
calculated a Person Index separately for each set of questions.
The Problem-Solving Index counts the number of nine explicit
event-related questions (e.g., ‘‘Why did the big triangle break the
house?’’) answered normally by each subject. Both indices were
calculated for the original nine normal controls and for SM’s first
testing session.
Fig. 1. Structural MRI of SM’s brain. Axial and coronal slices (A and C) show
the lack of signal at the amygdala, but a coronal slice at the level of the
hippocampus (B) shows that this structure is intact. (Photographs courtesy of
the Human Neuroimaging and Neuroanatomy Laboratory, Department of
Neurology, University of Iowa.)
Fig. 2. A scene from the classic Heider and Simmel (4) movie.
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Good Dog, Carl task. We also examined SM’s narration of a
children’s picture book, Good Dog, Carl (31). This book has
words only on the first and last page, the rest of its 40 pages
depicting the adventures of a baby with the dog entrusted to look
after it. This book differs from the target stimulus in that the
characters depicted are overtly animate creatures. The narra-
tions of this book given by SM and by five matched controls were
tape-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed in the same way as
their descriptions of the target film.
Results
Target Task. Every control subject described the movie as an
emotionally and socially significant interaction between the
characters (see Table 1 for a typical example). In contrast, SM
produced descriptions of normal length (Table 2), but essentially
devoid of social attributions (Table 1). The contrast between her
response and the affectivesocial biases of the control subjects is
evident in the percentages of words used in the three categories
of interest: SM used no Affect words and almost no Social words,
but a very high percentage of Movement words whereas controls
used consistently more Affect and Social words, but fewer
Movement words (Table 2). Strikingly, this pattern was evident
both in her initial description of the film and in her final,
post-questionnaire description.
Because the patterns of word use percentages were similar for
SM’s initial and final descriptions, we used their average in the
statistical analyses given below. These patterns were nearly
identical on SM’s second testing occasion 18 months later; we
report data from both occasions.
SM used fewer Affect words (first occasion, Z  1.81;
second occasion, Z  1.31; see Table 2 and Fig. 3), with the
effect most marked for her use of negative emotion words (first
occasion, Z  2.31; second occasion, Z  1.54), because of
lower variance in this category for the controls. She also tended
to use fewer Social Process words overall but used significantly
more words describing Movement (first occasion, Z  6.67;
second occasion, Z  6.55). This latter measure quantifies the
intuitive feeling, upon reading her description, that she described
the events of the film in physical but not affective terms. SM’s
difference score between AffectSocial Processes and Move-
ment word percentages was lower than that of any individual
control, and significantly lower than the mean of the control
group (Z  2.99, P  0.05; Fig. 3) This finding was replicated
on the second testing occasion (Z  2.65, P  0.05).
Comparisons with OFC-Lesioned Subjects. In contrast to SM, sub-
jects with OFC damage used Affect words in similar percentages
to normal controls [mean (SD): 2.03 (1.34); see Table 2]. On
average, they actually used a somewhat higher percentage of
Social Process words than did normal controls [6.99 (5.53)] and
a comparable number of Movement words [2.53 (1.67)]. Z-scores
comparing SM with the OFC-lesioned group show a pattern very
Table 1. Transcripts of spontaneous descriptions given by a normal control and by subject SM
Normal control
‘‘The bigger triangle was in control, or trying to take control of the smaller triangle and the circle, the rectangular shaped place was similar to
like a room with a closed door that um, if you went in there you were safe until that triangle came in. The small triangle and the circle were
trying to escape from the large triangle and when they did, the large triangle became very furious and destroyed things.’’
SM (initial description, first testing session)
‘‘OK, so, a rectangle, two triangles, and a small circle. Let’s see, the triangle and the circle went inside the rectangle, and then the other
triangle went in, and then the triangle and the circle went out and took off, left one triangle there. And then the two (pause) parts of the
rectangle made like a [sic] upside-down V, and that was it.’’
Table 2. Comparisons of LIWC percentages: SM’s description of the Heider and Simmel movie, on two testing occasions separated by
18 months
LIWC category
Matched
NC mean
(SD)
SM046
(occasion 1) Z-score (C.I.)
SM046
(occasion 2) Z-score (C.I.) OFC mean (SD)
Initial description
Total no. of words 97.11 (50.4) 70 0.54 (2.62, 1.54) 68 0.58 (2.66, 1.50) 145.63 (95.1)
Affect 3.23 (2.9) 0 1.12 (3.24, 1.01) 0 1.12 (3.24, 1.01) 1.44 (1.4)
Positive emotion 0.95 (1.7) 0 0.57 (2.65, 1.51) 0 0.57 (2.65, 1.51) 0.42 (0.43)
Negative emotion 2.28 (1.6) 0 1.44 (3.60, 0.72) 0 1.44 (3.60, 0.72) 1.02 (1.25)
Social processes 3.28 (3.0) 1.43 0.62 (2.70, 1.47) 0 1.09 (3.21, 1.03) 3.56 (2.4)
Movement 1.41 (1.5) 5.71 2.97 (0.53, 5.42) 8.82 5.12 (2.07, 8.18) 3.61 (2.13)
Final description
Total no. of words 54.89 (35.6) 141 2.42 (0.10, 4.74) 67 0.34 (1.73, 2.41) 73.00 (46.0)
Affect 2.18 (1.4) 0 1.52 (3.69, 0.65) 1.49 0.48 (2.56, 1.60) 2.82 (2.9)
Positive emotion 0 (0) 0 - 0 - 1.67 (2.64)
Negative emotion 2.18 (1.4) 0 1.52 (3.69, 0.65) 1.49 0.48 (2.56, 1.60) 1.15 (1.59)
Social processes 4.69 (5.4) 0.71 0.74 (2.83, 1.35) 2.99 0.32 (2.39, 1.75) 11.78 (9.7)
Movement 0.99 (1.4) 7.8 4.71 (1.79, 7.63) 4.48 2.41 (0.09, 4.73) 1.03 (1.5)
Mean of initial and final descriptions
Total no. of words 76 (32.5) 105.5 0.91 (1.20, 3.01) 67.5 0.26 (2.33, 1.81) 119.25 (75.6)
Affect 2.70 (1.5) 0 1.81 (4.02, 0.41) 0.75 1.31 (3.45, 0.84) 2.03 (1.34)
Positive emotion 0.48 (0.8) 0 0.57 (2.65, 1.51) 0 0.57 (2.65, 1.51) 0.96 (1.13)
Negative emotion 2.23 (1.0) 0 2.31 (4.61, 0.01) 0.75 1.54 (3.71, 0.64) 1.07 (1.17)
Social processes 3.98 (2.6) 1.07 1.13 (3.26, 0.99) 1.5 0.97 (3.08, 1.14) 6.99 (5.5)
Movement 1.20 (0.8) 6.755 6.67 (3.09, 10.25) 6.65 6.55 (3.01, 10.08) 2.53 (1.7)
LIWC, LINGUISTIC INQUIRY AND WORD COUNT. C.I., confidence interval. NC, normal control.
Heberlein and Adolphs PNAS  May 11, 2004  vol. 101  no. 19  7489
PS
YC
H
O
LO
G
Y
similar to that comparing SM with the normal controls: lower
Affect word use (first occasion, Z1.52; second occasion, Z
0.96), lower Social Process word use (first occasion, Z1.07;
second occasion, Z  0.99), and higher Movement word use
(first occasion, Z  2.54; second occasion, Z  2.48). If we
compare the difference score between the summed Affect and
Social Processes percentages and the Movement word percent-
ages, SM was lower than that of any individual OFC-lesioned
subject, and significantly lower than the mean of the OFC group
(Z  2.10 for the first occasion, and 1.87 for the second
occasion).
Control Tasks. In contrast to her spontaneous descriptions, SM’s
answers to specific questionnaire items were all within 1 SD of
the normal control means. In response to the questions, ‘‘What
was X like?’’ for each shape in turn, SM’s Person Index was 3
[control mean (SD), 3.6 (0.9)]. In response to the questions,
‘‘What kind of person was X?’’ her Person Index was 2 [control
mean(SD), 2.8 (1.8)]. SM’s Problem-Solving Index, measuring
her ability to answer specific socially relevant questions about the
actions of the three objects, was 0.33, somewhat lower than that
of the controls [mean (SD), 0.49 (0.17)].
In contrast to the pattern observed in her descriptions of the
Heider and Simmel film, SM’s description of the control
picture book contained an entirely normal percentage of words
in all three categories: Affect, Social Processes, and Movement
(Table 3).
Discussion
Anthropomorphizing does not occur when we attribute emotions
and mental content to actual social stimuli (e.g., other people);
rather, it occurs when we attribute social meanings to stimuli that
are not social, such as computers or clouds, presumably based on
cues that signal the presence of agency or emotion. That we do
so universally and automatically is a hallmark of human cogni-
tion, yet essentially nothing is known about the neural basis of
this process. Subject SM, who has bilateral amygdala damage,
gave an abnormally inanimate description of a film that was
described in anthropomorphic terms by all nine demographically
matched healthy controls and all eight OFC-damaged subjects.
This lack of anthropomorphizing was quantified by an extremely
low proportion of affect and social content words. Because she
nevertheless accurately recounted the events of the movie,
demonstrating intact memory for the stimulus, her description
contained an abnormally high number of movement words. Her
impairment was not a nonspecific result of brain damage in
general, or of damage to emotion-processing brain structures,
because the OFC subjects’ descriptions were comparable to
those given by the healthy controls. Our control tasks demon-
strated that SM’s failure to anthropomorphize cannot be due to
impairment of basic perception or language, nor does it seem to
be due to deficits in declarative social knowledge.
SM does not fail to perceive people, or explicit descriptions of
them, as social stimuli, either in real life or in extensive labora-
tory tasks (27). We believe that she gave abnormal descriptions
of the film stimulus we used here because it is not explicitly
social; taken at face value, it indeed shows the geometric
movements of inanimate shapes. Although her answers to some
explicit questions about the film’s social content were relatively
normal (e.g., ‘‘What was the big triangle like?’’ yielded ‘‘A
bully.’’), she often gave answers that were socially unsophisti-
cated and failed to take account of the overall social narrative of
the stimulus (e.g., ‘‘Why did the big triangle break the house?’’
yielded ‘‘Because it wanted to, I guess.’’). SM thus not only fails
completely to provide a social narrative when making the
spontaneous description, but also does not develop a normally
rich narrative when explicitly cued with questions. An emotional
response to the stimulus film may normally activate a social
schema (32), which is then reflected both in a richly emotional
and social description of the stimulus and in the presence of
narrative elements in answers to specific questions about the
events of the film. This interpretation is consistent with other
findings regarding the amygdala’s role in processing social
information, including functional imaging studies showing amyg-
dala activity in response to similar animated videos in normal
subjects (33, 34).
It remains puzzling that SM is nonetheless able to make some
social attributions to specific questioning, evidence that she is
not entirely unable to generate social attributions in response to
the same stimulus on which she fails in the spontaneous descrip-
tion. Our explanation of this residual ability rests on the hypoth-
esis that social attributions generally arise from at least two
distinct sets of processes: those that rely on automatic emotional
reactions to the stimulus (which SM presumably lacks), and those
that rely on deliberative retrieval of appropriate pieces of
declarative knowledge (which SM has). In support of this
interpretation of the impairment is SM’s documented pattern of
impairments on tasks of emotion judgments from faces. She fails
to show conditioned emotional responses, fails to recognize fear
in facial expressions, and does not recognize the level of emo-
tional arousal in multiple emotions, yet is able to provide entirely
Fig. 3. Comparison of word counts in descriptions given by SM and by normal
controls. Percentages of words used in the three categories of interest: Affect,
Social Processes, and Movement (see text). SM’s word use percentages are
indicated for the first (X) and second (star) testing sessions, and normal
controls by circles (their mean and SD are also shown). LIWC, LINGUISTIC INQUIRY
AND WORD COUNT.
Table 3. Comparisons of LIWC percentages: SM’s description of
the control picture book
LIWC category
Matched NC
mean (SD) SM Z-score (C.I.)
Total no. of words 694 (277) 233 1.66 (3.60, 0.95)
Affect 1.67 (0.82) 3.43 2.15 (0.64, 4.07)
Positive emotion 1.20 (0.62) 2.15 1.53 (1.03, 3.48)
Negative emotion 0.44 (0.26) 1.29 3.27 (0, 5.21)
Social processes 10.65 (2.77) 12.88 0.81 (1.54, 2.82)
Movement 2.95 (1.96) 4.29 0.68 (1.62, 2.71)
LIWC, LINGUISTIC INQUIRY AND WORD COUNT. C.I., confidence interval. NC, normal
control.
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normal descriptions of situations and behaviors associated with
fear when asked to do so (27, 35). When considered with respect
to the present set of results, the former set of impairments in
recognizing fear may rely on the ability to trigger an emotional
response to the stimulus whereas the latter involves deliberate
retrieval from semantic memory in response to an explicit
question.
A final question concerns the possibility of a developmental
component to SM’s impairment. Whereas the age at which she
acquired her lesion remains uncertain (27, 35), it was possibly
sustained early in life. If the impairment were to depend on a
developmental amygdala lesion, the most plausible mechanism
explaining the impairment would be that social knowledge was
never acquired normally in the first place during development,
and hence cannot be generated on our task. However, this
explanation evidently does not fit our findings: SM does show
clear evidence of having a store of social knowledge. What she
lacks is (at least) one specific mechanism for automatically
triggering its retrieval.
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